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with its numerous ethical and aesthetical impressions and ideas, to the more barren and less certainly valid concept of a Nature stripped of such impressions and ideas" (518). Nothing *trans-subjective*, nothing *given*, can be cognized. A man cannot get out of his skin and contemplate his skeleton. Professor Ladd well describes what he himself desires when he says: "Extensions of the negative positions of realistic students of nature, or of common minds that lack ethical and aesthetical impulses as well as philosophic insight, are forbidden by the theory of knowledge. *For you can never get to things, whether in the particular or in the large* — to that single Thing standing so silently over there and challenging your right to deny its existence, or to a World undergoing the most elaborate system of natural evolution — *except in reliance upon the cogency, the validity, and the significance of the idea*"¹ (569). But, so long as he admits that "it is quite impossible even to frame the conception of experience of the human sort without introducing that which is for us *extra-mentally* real and which is actually related to us, and to itself, in a variety of effective relations" (342, 343), he is bound to wander after will-o'-the-wisps, seeking for a reality which he already *has*, but deliberately *wills* not to perceive.

It would ill become one to take leave of a work which must lay many under obligation without noting its broad basis in a knowledge carefully garnered from many sources during long years, its candor, its striking variety of content, and its suggestiveness. It may lack "natural magic," but for this we shall call upon Professor Ladd when he comes to produce his system of Metaphysics.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

R. M. WENLEY.

Saggi di Filosofia. Di FRANCESCO DE SARLO. Vol. II. Torino. Carlo Clausen, 1897. — pp. 259.

In reading contemporary Italian philosophy one is apt to be struck by the frequency with which it unites the careful thoroughness, which makes us forgive the Germans for so much that is harsh and crabbed, with something of the clearness of presentation and regard for the niceties of form that give to the work of the best French thinkers such a peculiar distinction and charm. Is it, perhaps, to the land of Bruno and Campanella that we must look for a new renaissance of speculative study — a movement that shall give rise to a

¹ The italics are the author's.

vigorous and vitalizing philosophy expressed through the medium of lucid and beautiful language?

The present volume of Signor de Sarlo's *Essays* is, at all events, both attractive in style and valuable in matter. Of the three essays it contains, the first is a continuation of a study of the morphology of knowledge begun in an earlier volume, and this part is so closely connected with its predecessor that an attempt at a criticism, or even an exposition of it by itself, would be inexpedient. The third essay is a very careful examination of the main arguments in Mr. Bradley's work, *Appearance and Reality*. It is perhaps the clearest and most adequate criticism of that author's position that has yet appeared. It is, however, the second of the essays, which has for its subject "The Problem of Aesthetics," that I have chosen to consider somewhat in detail, not only because S. de Sarlo deals here with a branch of philosophy which has seldom received the attention it merits, but because he treats of it in such a way as to sketch very clearly and strongly his whole philosophic doctrine on its constructive side.

For aesthetics he claims a central position among the philosophic disciplines, in virtue of the essential character of the aesthetic problem. This problem "has its origin in the need for explaining how it is that what is presented to reason, to analysis through logical processes, as possessing certain characteristics (unity in variety, harmony, symmetry, individuality, constant numerical relations, proportion, etc.), is presented to the emotional side of human nature, to direct and immediate apprehension, as a concrete sensible representation, accompanied by a disinterested pleasurable feeling, which is called aesthetic emotion." The problem in one of its aspects appears when we observe that, on the one hand, beauty is clearly not a property which things possess independently of the percipient, while at the same time it is not the perceptive process considered in itself which constitutes the essential point in the aesthetic fact, but, rather, that which the perception or image symbolizes and represents. The problem in its epistemological form is this: How can the percept or image come to mean something other than itself? But if we ask how it is that this significant percept or image gives rise to an emotional state, the question is a psychological one. And, finally, if we examine the aesthetic object, whether of art or nature, as it is in itself and as abstracted from the percipient object, we touch on considerations which are essentially ontological and metaphysical. The thesis here implied, that aesthetics involves epistemology, psychology, and ontol-

ogy, S. de Sarlo maintains in an elaborate and comprehensive presentation of each of these aspects of the problem.

As has been said, the significance or symbolic character of a sense perception or image is essential to its aesthetic quality. How can what is rational or ideal be cognized as a fact of individual sense experience — sensibility and reason, the actual and the ideal, being apparently disparate elements? Precisely the same answer must be given to the problem in this more general form as in the more specific case of aesthetic perception. The sensible and intellectual elements which are present in cognition are not separable and independent facts; they exist only in close reciprocal relations to one another. As regards aesthetic perception, this becomes obvious when we examine the origin and the effect of a work of art. "The point of departure in artistic creation is an idea, that is to say, a universal which exists only in the mind of the artist. This universal is then rendered concrete by becoming the centre of numerous relations, and completely fixed and determined, taking its place in a given content. The universal element, the artistic idea, so made concrete and particular, objectifies itself in such a fashion as to generate in the contemplating subject a fact of a special kind, namely, aesthetic perception, hence it cannot but be operative in the mind of the subject perceiving the aesthetic object; and it is just through the activity of such universals that perception and feeling become expressive and significant."

Now, it is just on this working together of the ideal and the actual, of the universal and the particular, that all perception of reality depends. The specific character of aesthetic perception is due to the fact that the intelligible factor here transcends, as it were, its embodiment in sense percept or image. If the ideal content were wholly one with its actual existence, there would be no aesthetic phenomenon. It is as something conjoined with what is, in a sense, foreign to it that the ideal becomes an object of beauty. The mind separates what is intelligible from its own existence to conjoin it to a new existence. But how can such disjunction take place? And what is the intelligible factor considered in itself? Such questions, S. de Sarlo points out, lead to a recognition not only of the reciprocal character of such concepts as ideal and real, intelligible and sensible, universal and particular, but of the essential unity of mind itself with that of which it is conscious. "The human spirit succeeds in symbolizing the real because it is capable of presenting under subjective form what is indiscernibly identical between reality and the subject.

Thus we may conclude that the disjunction of the ideal content from the fact, can take place because of the mind, which, as one may say, gathers from the real that which is identical with itself, and, subjecting it to a sort of psychological elaboration, presents it under the form of a psychical, and therefore subjective, fact, yet having always an objective reference." The ideal content is thus what makes reality objective and capable of expression. The intelligible belongs to *all* thinking beings, and thus points to an identity of thought underlying the separations of individual existence. "If all reality did not form a whole, a system, an Identity variously differentiated, on the one hand, mind could not be universal, and, on the other, the intelligibility of things would be impossible. What, indeed, is intelligibility, if not the form as distinguished from the matter, the coherence, the nexus, the relation considered in itself? Now, form, coherence, relation imply a fundamental unity and identity. We may say that each mind can only appropriate what it recognizes as inherent in mind in general."

The psychological side of the aesthetic problem has to do with the feeling which the beautiful inspires, and the discussion of this leads the author to present his theory of feeling in general. Put briefly, this consists in regarding feeling *per se* as identical with the totality of the psychical life as undifferentiated and unqualified. "Feeling is a mode of existence of the psychical activity which originates whenever the content of consciousness is of such a character that, not being decomposable into qualities and relations, it appears as something indistinct." Even pleasures and pains are not strictly qualities of feeling. "Pleasure and pain are qualities which may be produced in part from the totality of the psychical life — from the state in which that totality is found, but they are not qualities of the totality." "Feeling or the total psychical state may help to generate a state of pleasure or of pain, but cannot present itself as pleasure or as pain."

The criticism that suggests itself of this and all similar presentations of feeling as the wholly undifferentiated and unqualified background to the known facts of our mental life, is the lack of intelligibility in the explanation offered. It is true that the emotional life, as compared with the intellectual, is vague and indefinite. But is there such a total absence of differentiation as is here supposed? The feeling we 'know' is of course always qualified and related. The psychical totality as wholly undifferentiated cannot be known, cannot be 'for us' at all. May we not say that feeling only is as it

is cognized, and, therefore, to some extent, differentiated and related? Is this phantom, this *ding-an-sich* of feeling as the uncognized psychical totality, of any assistance to us in explaining such concrete facts of consciousness as are constituted by our various feelings and emotions?

I must pass briefly over the treatment of aesthetics as related to metaphysics. The 'form' of a work of art is due to the existence of the ideal or rational element in it, and it is the fact of the expression of this ideal, which is the end of its production, rather than any extrinsic utility, which makes it to be a work of art. As it is the rational or intelligible in the artistic creation which gives it value and meaning, so if we ask after the value and meaning of the world of nature, we are led to a similar apprehension of rationality in it. Since, moreover, we find in nature those same qualities which belong to artistic production, there is reason to surmise a fundamental unity to exist between the ideal world of art and the real world of nature, the one being the conscious or semi-conscious, the other the unconscious work of the same underlying activity.

From what has gone before it will be easy to see what attitude S. de Sarlo takes toward the main questions of philosophy. He is an idealist who recognizes that the ideal only has meaning in relation to the real. Apart from the ideal, the rational, the universal, there could be no knowledge, no art, no morality; yet the intelligible factor only realizes itself by its correlation with the particular, the sensible, the actual. "The essence of consciousness," he tells us in the closing paragraph of the essay on the "The Notion of Law," "consists in the objectifying and universalizing of psychical facts; an objectifying which implies fixation in given forms, and this in its turn connection and coherence with the system or with the totality of the qualifications and characterizations of reality. Such system or totality constitutes the world as known by us, the world, that is to say, which in its reality is intelligible for us."

E. RITCHIE.

Geschichte des Idealismus. Von OTTO WILLMANN, Professor der Philosophie und Paedagogik an der deutschen Universität in Prag. Zweiter Band. Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker. Braunschweig, Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1896. — pp. vi, 652.

Those who have read Professor Willmann's former volume will remember what meaning he gives to the word 'idealism.' By that